Note: This was originally written by Exltcmts.
In 1824, the U.S. Army consisted of the Regular Army, volunteers raised by the States as authorized and funded by Congress and directed by the President and the militia called into Federal service under Section 8, Article I of the Constitution to oppose foreign invasion or internal armed insurrection. In general, it was accepted that the militia could not serve outside the country, a viewpoint later confirmed by a Supreme Court ruling.
Under Section 8, Article I of the Constitution, Congress organized, supplied, paid, uniformed, armed and decided the discipline (drill and tactics) of the Regular Army and commissioned its officers. The President as Commander in Chief directed through the Commanding General of the Army and the Secretary of War, the operations of the Army.
Also under Section 8, Article I, Congress was given the authority, responsibility and power to organize, arm and select the discipline of the militia. The States were given the responsibility and authority for commissioning the officers of the militia and ensuring the training and readiness of the militia.
The Militia Act of 1792 as amended, as the instrument in executing Congress’ authority, powers and responsibility, defined the militia as all white, male citizens, between 17 and 55. The law specified that each militiaman would arm himself with musket and bayonet or rifle and knife, along with appropriate ammunition. The arms would stored at home and inspected by the appropriate state officials on a regular basis. The States were responsible for organizing the militia on the plan provided by Congress and drilling and inspecting the militia on a regular basis. When mobilized by the State, the militia was commanded by the Governor and his appointed officers and paid by the legislature. When mobilized into Federal service, Congress paid, supplied and disciplined the militia and appointed the general officers. Company and field grade officers were appointed by the Governor or elected. Each State passed laws outlining the organization and defining the uniform of the militia. There were no provisions for enforcing the law, and the militia soon came to rely on the State or the Federal government to arm them to avoid the expense of acquiring and maintaining weapons.
In 1824, Congress authorized the Regular Army to consist of six regiments of infantry and four of artillery. Each regiment consisted of ten companies and a staff. War strength by table of organization was over a thousand strong, but funded end strength, along with attrition from disease and desertion, left most regiments with between three and five hundred men. Regiments were scattered by companies across a number of posts and forts and even a single regiment had been concentrated only a few times since 1819. Some larger posts like Fort Snelling held several companies. Whenever several companies operated together they formed as a “battalion”. Two of the ten infantry companies were designated “flank” companies and were supposed to serve as light infantry. Given the dispersed nature of the regiments and the demands of frontier service, most of the companies would have more experience operating in “open” order than formed for battle. As the Mexican War showed, it took some time to shake down and train up the regiments once concentrated, though the problem with superannuated officers faced in 1846 would not be as great an issue in 1824. The artillery regiments were also deployed by companies. Each company, however, was not issued guns. An artillery company was expected to operate field, siege, fortress or coastal artillery, or even serve as infantry. As a cost-savings measure, Congress had deactivated the Regiment of Light Artillery, and then had sold off most of the field equipment and horses in 1821. The result was that in the Mexican War only one or two companies of each regiment served as “light” or field artillery. For 1824, the results would have been the same. One or two companies per regiment were provided field guns, equipment and horses and the rest formed in eight company battalions of “red-legged” infantry. A “light” company was not horse artillery. Gunners would have ridden the caissons and other vehicles or run alongside the guns. There was no permanent organization above the regiment. Companies, battalions and regiments would be collected into task organized forces and labeled “brigades” or “divisions”. The Regular Army in 1824 did not have mounted units, though occasionally infantry would be temporarily mounted on horses or mules for mobility. Cavalry would be provided by volunteers and militia. The “war” strength of a regiment, infantry or artillery was over a thousand officers, non-commissioned officers and privates. A company would usually have three officers (a captain and two lieutenants), four sergeants, four corporals, two drummers and one hundred men. In peacetime, Congress adjusted the number of privates to the perceived threat and available funds. This meant that companies were usually authorized forty privates, and with desertion and disease, thirty on hand.
The militia was supposed to mirror the Regular Army, with ten companies per regiment. This was not always so, especially as the militia included not only infantry and artillery, but light infantry, rifles, hussars, lancers, dragoons, light dragoons and mounted rifles. For the most part, the militia artillery units were tied to coastal forts where they represented the wartime garrisons. According to Federal and State law, the basic administrative unit for the militia was the company. The company commander was responsible for maintaining the list of eligible manpower within a specific geographical area. It was the company commander who generally dealt with the State Adjutant General. It was also at the company level that most militia training took place. Rarely were the battalions, regiments, brigades and divisions of the militia on the order of battle concentrated for training. Despite having a higher framework of organization, the militia mustered and mobilized at the company level, which left the ability to maneuver and fight at the battalion and regimental level lacking. Moreover, as the frontier receded, the militia system in the East and North-East, except for the State of New York, atrophied and dwindled, despite the law. This was primarily because the Federal law had no enforcement mechanism and local and State politics prevented the thorough application of such enforcement as existed in State laws. Militia drill in these states became a social event. The closer a State was to the frontier the more effective the militia and in the South, where the fear and threat of slave revolts and runaway slaves kept the militia busy.
It was during this period that the “volunteer” era of the militia began. The organized militia was replaced by a smaller number of companies created by cities, counties and other local organizations. These units were formed by membership who paid dues, armed themselves, adopted uniforms and then petitioned the State for recognition. The legislature would grant a charter and the officers, elected by the volunteers, were commissioned by the Governor. The evolution was the result of both the gradual atrophy of the organized militia and the costs to the State of maintaining a militia containing all the military age male population.
When the US entered the War of 1812, the law applying to the militia was unsettled, but was determined quite quickly. Militia mobilized into Federal service could (would) not be used outside the territory of the US. Another issue was that militia could not be mobilized for more than ninety consecutive days nor serve more than 90 days a year. The result was the raising of volunteer Federal forces through the States from the militia for varying periods of service. Porter’s Brigade at Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane was composed of Federal volunteers from New York and Pennsylvania. Given that a war with Arkansas would be a “foreign” war, the militia could not be called into Federal service for service across the Mississippi. Instead, the Clay Administration would have called for Federal volunteers from the States. As in the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, these Federal volunteer regiments would be comprised of units and individuals from the militia formed by the States and designated as such. Since the members of such regiments were volunteers, not drafted or mobilized from the general militia, physical standards and morale tended to be superior to a comparable militia organization. Volunteer regiments elected their company grade officers while the field officers were appointed by the Governor. In general, the States would have tried to select field officers with some military training. As units raised for Federal service, and paid, armed, equipped and uniformed by the Federal government, these volunteer regiments tended (though the Illinois regiment at Buena Vista broke at contact, but then rallied and returned to the battle) to shake down and perform well during the Mexican War when in Mexico. The issue with such volunteer units was that they were usually recruited for a single year of duty, thus by the time they were trained and experienced, they had to be demobilized and sent home. The volunteer regiments also never reached the level of discipline and conduct of the Regulars, one thing they did have in common with the militia. Volunteer units mobilized at war strength, over a thousand officers, NCOs and men, but quickly lost strength to consumption (officers, NCOs and men unable or unwilling to adjust to military life, desertion, physically unable to bear the stress of training and campaigning and losses to disease from poor hygiene due to poor individual and unit discipline).
The United States drafts individuals into its Armed Forces, it does not conscript. The Constitution and subsequent law make every male military age citizen or prospective citizen a Soldier, untrained, unorganized, unarmed, and not on active duty, but, never the less, a Soldier. Even during Colonial times, when the Colonies/States raised volunteer forces, individuals would be drafted from the militia when insufficient volunteers came forward. The draft (or Selective Service) simply moves Soldiers from one status (inactive in the Unorganized Reserves) to another (on active duty with the Active Component).
In a historical situation similar to that in the book, Harrison’s army at Arkansas Post would have consisted of a brigade of Regulars, the 1st, 3d, 4th and 6th Infantry Regiments, a battalion of “red-legged” infantry from the 1st Artillery Regiment, two companies of field artillery from the same regiment armed with 6pdr field guns and 12pdr howitzers. He could have a company or more of volunteer mounted Rangers as his scouting force. The militia would have been volunteer infantry regiments in a brigade. The brigade would have been commanded by a politician with some military experience (like Porter in 1814) granted a general officer or field commission by the President. The volunteer regiments would have had about thirty days to shake down into regiments and establish discipline. They would have been less effective and more brittle than a Regular regiment, but history shows they would have performed better than a brigade of militia. The volunteer brigade would have consisted of the 1st -3d Georgia Volunteer Infantry, the 1st Alabama Volunteer Infantry, the 1st Louisiana Volunteer Infantry and the 1st Mississippi Volunteer Infantry. The Regular infantry regiments and the artillery battalion would be hard-pressed to put more than four hundred men into line. The two companies of light artillery would account for ~250 men. The mounted Rangers would add another 100-200. And the volunteer infantry regiments would probably add up to 3,000 to 3,500 with the strongest regiments being those from Georgia and the weakest from Mississippi.
It is generally taken as law by military professionals that an attacking force needs at least a three to one superiority in combat effectiveness for success. With Arkansas fielding six infantry regiments, at least three artillery battalions and Indian auxiliaries to a number around 7,000 at a minimum and with a military age population of around 33,000 males, the US would have to muster a sustained effort of at least 21,000 Regulars and volunteers and as many as 100,000. As pointed out by Mr. Flint, it took two years after the authorized increases of the Regular Army in 1812 to reach 15,000 Soldiers and the maximum strength reached of just over 38,000 in 1815, was about 60% of what was authorized. It would be expected that more artillery companies would be equipped as light or field artillery, the infantry regiments doubled in number, rifle and dragoon regiments raised for the Regular Army. The major part of the armies to be thrown against Arkansas would be volunteers. The political situation would limit volunteer recruitment to the South with some Regular Army recruiting in the North and West, primarily amongst recent immigrants. The pool of available military age males would run around 1,000,000 in 1825. The actual number in states willing to support the war might be no more than 200,000. In the Civil War, despite a military population of over 3.5 million, the Union never mobilized more than 1.25M troops in any given year. And it took two years before the industrial capability of the Union was translated into military strength with sufficient arms, equipment and uniforms being produced to fully equip the armies in the field to standard. But with the Mexican War as an example, a force of 100,000 men, sustained and maintained through a number of years, might be beyond the capability of the US in 1824. This doesn’t consider that the arms, equipment and supplies supporting this army would come from the North and West where opposition to the war would be strongest. The US certainly had trouble sustaining an annual end-strength of around 45,000 effectives in 1815, despite a military aged male population of around 350,000 to 400,000, but reflected in the resistance of the North-East to “Mr. Madison’s War”.
There were no official manuals on strategy, operational art, tactics, logistics, or staff operations. There was no system of officer or NCO education as exists today. Once an officer graduated from West Point, any further development would be up to the individual, and few US Army officers matched Scott in his desire for personal professional development.
The basis of discipline and “tactics” was drill. Drill was the assembly, control and maneuver of troops. The tactical unit was the “battalion”. The regiment and the company were administrative terms. In drill, the maneuver units were the “battalion”, “division” and “platoon”. In the US Army, the “battalion” was synonymous with the regiment, as the company was with the “platoon”. A pair of companies/”platoons” made up a “division”. Two “divisions” made up a “grand division”. In line tactics, the company/”platoon” was not an independent unit, but a sub-unit of the “battalion” to execute the movement and formation of the “battalion”. Companies not attached to regiments had to be “brigaded” or “converged” into “battalions” to maneuver as part of the line. With the US Army dispersed in company sized posts across the nation, “battalion” training had to be conducted after concentration. At the beginning of the Mexican War, there were field grade officers that could not conduct drill or maneuver a “battalion”, never having had to do so in the period since the War of 1812.
The drill manual in effect in 1824 was the “System of 1815”, which would soon be replaced by the Regulations of 1825, which featured only minor changes. Congress passed a law in 1820 directing the militias to conform to the “System of 1815”. Winfield Scott led the board that developed the “System of 1815” and heavily influenced the outcome. The “System of 1815” was the French “Reglement of 1791” as amended by various Imperial decrees and modifications by MacDonald, Ney and Davout. The “Reglement of 1791” was written around a two battalion regiment, each battalion having four line and an elite companies. The elites were generally “converged” into grenadier and chasseur battalions, leaving the battalion with four companies to execute a drill based on eight “peletons”. It featured movement and “waiting” in columns and combat in line or square. It did not address light infantry. It featured a three rank line. The “assault” column was a development of the French Revolution. Scott adapted the drill to the US Army, using a two rank line. Light infantry was not formally addressed until the Regulations of 1825, but the unofficial “system” was to use the flank companies as light infantry, leaving eight “line” companies to maneuver as a “battalion”. An US Army infantry regiment, when concentrated, would march and maneuver on the field as a column of “platoons”, one company wide and eight companies deep. The Soldiers were formed elbow to elbow or with a width of between 20” and 24” and one foot between ranks. At 24 inches and with a normal strength company of about forty privates and corporals and including NCOs and officers, a company/”platoon” in two ranks would be 84 feet wide and 3-4 feet deep. A “closed” column placed the companies/”platoons” right behind each other, a distance of 1-2 feet apart. A regiment/”battalion” would then be 35-52 feet deep. An “open” column, from which a regiment/”battalion” would normally deploy into line, would a company/”platoon” width distance between companies over 600 feet deep. Deployed into line, a regiment would be 672 feet wide. The French “pace” was 26 inches, the American, 30 inches. The “ordinary” cadence was 76 “paces” a minute covering 190 feet. The “maneuver” cadence was 120 “paces” a minute covering 300 feet. The cadence for the run was 240 “paces” a minute covering 600 feet. All maneuvers were carried out at the maneuver cadence. To deploy from an open column of “platoons” would take three minutes for an eight company battalion/regiment, the rear most “platoon” traveling 810 feet. If the battalion/regiment were formed in a “closed” column of “divisions” (two “platoons abreast, the “assault” column), deployment to line would take 2 minutes, the rear most “platoons” covering 490 feet. “Ploying” or reforming into an “open” column of “platoons” from line would take 3 minutes, while “ploying” back into an “assault” column from line would take 1.5 minutes. In both cases, the foremost elements will “mark time” in place. If the battalion/regiment continues to move forward at the “ordinary” pace, the time to deploy would increase by 6 minutes as the elements behind catch up to the forward elements to take their place in the line. If the forward elements are moving at the “maneuver” pace, the rear elements would have to execute at the run, and even so, the deployment will take 4 more minutes and the battalion/regiment is subject to becoming disorganized, while the rearmost elements will be fatigued at the end of the maneuver. Since the line was used for fire combat and the follow-up bayonet charge, most battalion/regimental commanders would halt the unit while deploying to ensure the smoothest deployment and minimize disruption. Remember that this performance was by a cohesive unit with well-trained Soldiers. Battalions made up of Soldiers less well trained would take longer to execute their deployments. Battalions that were less cohesive, made up of companies only just concentrated from dispersed posts or companies consolidated from heavy losses or converged from different regiments would also take more time. It was also important that the “rank and file” be, more or less, evenly distributed across the companies/”platoons” to insure smooth execution of deployments.
The regulations of 1791 used a three rank line with just the forward two ranks firing. The US Army used a two rank line exclusively. The relevant firing systems were by “platoon”, by “half battalion” and by battalion. In battalion firing the battalion would fire a volley together. In “half battalion”, 4 companies/”platoons” would fire, the other half waiting for the firing troops to get half way through the loading sequence before firing. In “platoon” firing, the 1st “platoon” would fire, followed by the 3d, 5th, 7th, 2d, 4th, 6th and 8th “platoons” in sequence, the tempo of firing being controlled by the officers so that the 1st “platoon” would ready to fire at the end of the sequence. In advancing fire, the sequence for “platoon” firing would be followed, starting with 1st “platoon” firing, advancing while loading, halt and finish loading and then fire again as its position in the sequence came up again. The final system was to fire by ranks. The second rank would fire first, the first rank firing when the second was halfway through reloading. In most cases, unless used by cohesive and well-trained troops, any time a battalion started firing, the system devolved into each Soldier loading and firing as fast as he could, in the direction his NCOs or officers in the immediate vicinity pointed him in. And once a unit started firing, it became difficult to get it moving again. The effectiveness of this fire varied dependent on terrain, foliage, weather, fatigue, ammunition availability, training and cohesiveness. The tests conducted by various armies of the smooth bored, muzzle loading musket over a period of about one hundred years showed an optimum performance of ~65% hits on a battalion formed in line at 150 yards. Under the worst conditions, this effectiveness could approach zero. One way the US Army tried to increase the percentage of hits was with “buck and ball”. A ball and three buck shot would be combined in a cartridge. Under optimum conditions, effectiveness approached 90% at 50 yards and declined as far as 20%. An individual Soldier could fire as many as three rounds a minute under optimum conditions. The use of flintlock mechanisms, black powder, paper cartridges and muzzle loading could result in 20% misfires even under optimum conditions. Soldiers could pour powder on the ground, forget to prime the pan, even shoot away their ramrods. Until officers and NCOs lost control of the firing sequence, unit firing would not be faster then two rounds a minute. Still, remember that at “ordinary” pace, a battalion crossed 63 yards a minute, and one hundred yards at “maneuver” pace. If the first volley occurred at 150 yards, the second would occur at 50 yards. If the firing unit had 500 men, and the attacking unit had 500 men, the attacking unit would lose 325 men at the first volley and be wiped out at the second under optimum conditions. Under the worst case scenario, that same unit would lose only 100 men. If the defending unit’s conditions were toward the worst case scenario and the attacking unit’s toward the optimum conditions and using advancing fire, the defending unit might inflict 100 casualties while the attacking unit would inflict ~385 men, leaving 115 defenders facing 400 attackers. Alternately, the attacking unit could stop at 50 yards and conduct fire combat and at the third volley, wipe out the defenders at a cost of 180 casualties. But again, optimum conditions would never exist, the first volleys creating clouds of smoke across the battlefield, misfire rates climbing as flints wore down, the rate of fire slowing as Soldiers became fatigued and sloppy and musket barrels and touch pans became clogged with residue. Rifles suffered much the same issues, though the rate of fire was driven by the need to ram a patched (usually linen, leather or paper) ball down the barrel and the deliberate aiming to no more than one round a minute. The deliberate rate of fire would also reduce fouling, flints from dulling and mistakes in loading which led to misfires.
Light infantry and rifle units were touched upon by the “System of 1815”, but most of the doctrine was developed from regiment to regiment, from commanding officer to commanding officer. The sources were von Steuben, various simplifications and translations of French standing orders and British practice. The basic formation was a skirmish line in extended order supported by a formed unit. The skirmish line would contain anywhere from 25% to 100% of the skirmishing unit. The Soldiers would act in pairs, five to six feet apart. One Soldier would have a loaded musket or rifle at all times. If no formed unit was nearby, a skirmishing company or detachment commander would keep 25% to 75% of his unit formed in column or mass under his direct control. He could use these Soldiers to rotate fresh skirmishers into the line, reinforce the line or serve as a rally point when the skirmish line was driven in by line infantry or cavalry. Skirmishers would cover the main force, staying 100 paces (250 feet) in the direction of the greatest threat. They could screen movement or evolutions, especially if there was little wind as their powder smoke would act as a smoke screen. They would also seek out the enemy formations if they were masked by terrain and break through the enemy skirmishers when needed. Skirmishers could do significant damage to a formation of troops uncovered by terrain or their own skirmishers. Their aimed fire from cover would slowly eliminate the officers and NCOs slowly shredding the cohesion of the target unit. The target unit’s volleys or fire would be less effective against dispersed targets using cover. The greatest danger to light infantry and rifles were light cavalry. Working in open formation, if a formed unit was not available to fall back on, light cavalry could run down individuals and pairs. The best the light infantry could do would be to clump into small groups and hope to keep the sabers away. Riflemen, without bayonets, were even easier prey. Skirmishing was not a mission for untrained troops. Militia could act in “open” order, especially in close terrain, but maintaining a skirmish line oriented on the enemy while covering your own formations, keeping the skirmish line fed with fresh men and not going to ground was beyond them.
The US Army’s infantry and artillery serving as infantry were armed with the .69 Musket, Model of 1795 and its variations, such as the Model of 1816. The musket weighed almost twelve pounds and was almost six feet long with bayonet attached, fired a one ounce ball at 700 to 900fps (the variations in batches of black powder, plus the variation in the powder load after priming the pan and the possibility of spillage creates this variable) to an effective range of 50 meters for an individual target and 150 meters for a formation. Maximum range at which the musket could inflict any significant casualties was 250 meters. This was also the standard shoulder arm for volunteers and militia. The US armories at Springfield and Harper’s Ferry both produced more arms annually than the Regular Army could use, as did the occasional contracted manufacturer (over 700,000 Model of 1816 muskets were produced for the Federal government through 1844). These arms were passed on (under a law passed in 1808 in which $200,000 in Federal arms and equipment were distributed to the states in proportion to their reported militia strengths) or sold to the States, who could also contract or manufacture, on occasion, their own arms. Thus a force made up of Regulars and volunteers would be armed with the same musket. The standard rifles were the Model of 1817, which did not take a bayonet, of which over 38,000 were produced between 1818 and 1842. Also just entering service was Hall’s breech loading rifle, the Model of 1819, which did take a bayonet, two thousand being manufactured in 1824-1825. The Hall’s breech loading rifle was twice as effective as a musket and 10% more effective than the Model 1817 rifle but it generated 33% less penetration and the gas leak plus the flash in the pan could injure the firer. Both were .54 caliber and fired a lighter ball than a musket. A rifle in the hands of a trained Soldier was effective against individual targets at 150 meters and formations at up to 500 meters. The muzzle loading rifle using the simple spherical ball of the time and took up to three times longer to load than a musket. It also lacked a bayonet. It required a patched ball to take the rifling, making it difficult to load or fire quicker than a musket, though because rifles were shorter than muskets, they could be more easily loaded kneeling and when prone. Rifles were also generally less robust than muskets. Under the 1825 regulations, which were a slight modification of the “System of 1815”, one company of each infantry regiment could be armed with rifles. This was a response to the deactivation of the rifle regiments in 1815 and 1819. There were rifle companies and regiments, both foot and mounted in the militia, and Ranger companies, both mounted and foot generally using rifles. The artillery regiments would be armed with the standard infantry muskets as “light” or field artillery. Gun crews generally stacked their muskets in order to serve the gun. Any Regular, volunteer or militia cavalry would be armed with swords, pistols and carbines. Mounted artillerymen might also be armed with sabers. Mounted rangers, other than officers, rarely carried swords, being armed with military or commercial rifles. The US did not produce a carbine for cavalry until 1835.
US artillery was equipped with guns and howitzers using the British system of nomenclature and weights. Field artillery consisted of 6 pounder and 12 pounder guns and 12 pounder and 24 pounder howitzers. The nomenclature indicated the solid ball shot that the gun or howitzer could fire with the diameter of the bore. Howitzers, however, did not fire shot, being limited to canister and shell. Howitzers used short barrels to achieve greater elevation over guns (though not comparable to modern artillery) to project shells over walls, fortifications or to cover dead space behind hills. Guns fired shot and canister at targets directly in line of sight. What I cannot discover is when the US Army adopted case or shrapnel shells but at least by 1841. They certainly had them in the Mexican War and did not have them in the War of 1812. Shrapnel or case was a British “secret” weapon during the Napoleonic Wars. A company was issued guns, equipment and horses and then had to recruit the horse handlers and drivers, along with specialists like the blacksmith and veterinarian. It took some time for a company to shake down into an effective battery. The standard gun was the 6pdr Model of 1819 made of iron, iron being cheaper than bronze and not having to be imported like copper. A major problem with the Model of 1819 was the lack of “metal” around the breech and chamber area, and the change in iron smelting process that led to “weak” cast iron. The Model of 1819 made a reputation for bursting on proof and in the field. The US Army continued to try and correct the problem, but in 1841, finally went back to bronze for field artillery. There was no corresponding 12pdr howitzer until 1836. The gun tube weighed on average, 740 pounds. Accuracy to the millimeter was a thing of the future, and gun tubes could vary as much a 10% in weight, and often in dimensions. The only standard was the diameter of the bore. The tubes would be produced by foundries, both government and commercial, and then stored. At least 74 Model 1819 guns were accepted by the Army at a time when there were no “light” or field artillery companies. When the guns were needed, the tubes would be withdrawn from storage, cleaned up and mounted. There would have also been 6pdr iron guns in storage from the War of 1812. These would have been patterned after British designs and weighed more, up to 900 pounds. The US Army had adopted, for the most part, the Gribeauval system field carriage from the French in 1809. The carriage was double stocked with iron fittings and painted light blue. The US Army, however, never adopted the sectional iron tires of the French system. A carriage weighed over 1,000 pounds, so that with equipment and an ammunition box, the whole gun could weigh at least a ton. A company of “light” artillery could require up to eighty horses or mules. The equipment for the most part matched the system. Heavy gun in the field would have been the 12pdr Gun, Model of 1819 and the 24pdr Howitzer of the same system. The problem is that records are sparse, with 12pdr guns to this design being accepted in 1827, and howitzers in 1825. It is possible that 12pdr guns and 24pdr howitzers from the War of 1812 were still available. A 12pdr gun weighed over two tons. Shot and canister were the main ammunition for field guns. The 6pdr iron shot could reach 1,200 yards and was effective out to 700 yards when the ground was hard and the shot would rebound after first graze. Tests showed that under optimum conditions, a 6pdr gun could hit a formation of troops on a company frontage 17% of the time at 1,200 yards, 40% at 950 yards or 82% at 520 yards. Of course, conditions were rarely optimal. A rolling cannon ball retained enough kinetic energy to take a foot off. Fired perpendicular to a line, the ball might inflict one to three casualties, but if taken in enfilade or against a column, a single shot could kill and maim a dozen or more men, with the shot skipping through the formation into anything behind it. Soft ground, however, could degrade or even prevent the rebound of the shot. A 6pdr shot could penetrate up to eight feet of rammed earth dirt at 500-600 yards. Canister consisted of a number of iron balls filling a tin canister. Canister came as a “fixed” round, the powder charge and canister being one piece, where shot and powder were “separate” , the powder in a flannel bag being loaded and then the shot. There was “heavy” canister, 24 four ounce iron balls, and “light” canister with 48 two ounce balls for the 6pdr gun. Iron balls were used because lead balls would become distorted as they bounced down the barrel. “Heavy” canister could be effective against formations out to 500 yards and “light” out to 300 yards. At close range, a gun could be double loaded with a canister round over shot or two canister rounds. Canister exited the gun in a cone like a shotgun, which meant the farther the range, the fewer balls actually hit the target, the rest going into the air or the ground. Even at nearly point rank range, as many as 50% of the balls could miss. The rate of fire under optimum conditions was up to eight rounds a minute. As usual, optimum conditions were rare, with crews starting out at four to even six rounds a minute and dropping as smoke, ground conditions and fatigue intervened to even less than one round a minute. Keep in mind that when a 6pdr gun fired, a ton of metal and wood recoiled back some six to twelve feet depending on ground conditions. That ton of weight would have to be man-handled forward into battery for the next shot every time the gun was fired. In battle, guns would fire in short, concentrated bursts as targets became visible and available. A limbered 6pdr gun usually had six horses assigned. Since some of the gun crew walked or ran alongside the guns, a company could move no faster than a man or not much more than 600 feet a minute for short periods. Once the gun was placed in battery, it could be re-limbered and moved, but this was a difficult thing to execute under fire. Otherwise, the gun crews using bricoles and ropes would try to pull the gun. A six gun battery of 6pdr guns would take up over 900 feet when moving in column. When placed in battery, the gun line would be around 100 to 200 feet wide and with their limbers to the rear, 150 to 300 feet deep. The company caisons and wagons would be even further back so that a company of “light” artillery could take up an area 200 feet wide and 600 feet deep. A company with 12pdrs would take up to 50% more area. The 12pdr gun could reach 1,800 yards, with an effective range of 900 yards. Effective range for “heavy” canister would be around 600 yards and “light” canister, 400 yards. A 12pdr gun could drive a shot through nine feet of rammed earth at 650 yards. Weighing two tons, rate of fire ran at five rounds a minute in optimal conditions, much less otherwise. A 12pdr gun took eight horses and once positioned, would not be easy to move around the battlefield. If howitzers were fielded, they would be placed in “mixed” batteries of two howitzers to four guns. A 12pdr howitzer weighed in at much the same weight as a 6pdr gun. A 12pdr howitzer of the period would throw a ten pound shell to 1,200 yards, but effective range would be closer to 800. Canister fired from a howitzer had slightly less effective range since the short barrel allowed the pattern of the balls to expand more rapidly. Shells suffered a “dud” rate of around 20% under optimum conditions. A ten pound shell filled with black powder produced far less explosive force and the cast iron shells tended to break into a few large pieces. Such a shell had less of a casualty producing radius than a modern hand grenade. Given the complexity of artillery drill, artillerymen had to be reasonably smart. Given the physical nature of the work, they also tended to be large and muscular. A minimum gun crew was six men, but the rate of fire would be very slow. A company usually had 150 men, including drivers. Often, artillery companies drafted in additional manpower from supporting infantry units. 3pdr guns had not been produced since 1790 at the latest. 4pdr field guns, both Swedish and French, had been disposed of by 1795.
Engineers in the US Army were limited to a small group of officers, the elite of the graduating classes from West Point. There had been an engineer unit raised in 1814, but deactivated in 1819. Engineers led exploratory teams, drew maps, designed and managed the construction of posts and fortifications and civil engineering projects. When engaged in field engineering the officers directed work details from the infantry and artillery regiments.
Support troops. The US Army was supported by the War Department, which executed its responsibilities for administration, logistics, procurement, pay, health services and ordnance. The exact division of responsibilities between the Commanding General and the Secretary of War was not firmly established and would remain open to interpretation until replaced the staff system in 1903. In general, the Secretary was the President’s representative to Congress for the budget and annual reports and managed the War Department Bureaus and the Military Districts for the execution of administrative tasks. The Commanding General had operational control of the regiments and any higher organizations temporarily created for mission command. Both the staff of the War Department and the Commanding General were certainly in better shape than before the War of 1812, but Congress had scrapped several good ideas that had come out of the war and cut back the staffs to where expansion and operations for the war across the Mississippi would be seriously delayed and poorly supported. It would take time, as it did just before the Mexican War and at the start of the Civil War to expand the staffs and train their members to competently perform their extended duties. As it was, there would be sufficient weapons for an army twice the size or more of the peacetime order of battle in 1824, but not uniforms or equipment, especially tents and wagons nor would ammunition, food, medical supplies, and horses and mules be quickly found to support a larger army.
The US Army changed its uniform regulations in 1821. Prior to that, the Regulations of 1813 were in effect. The new regulations lasted until 1833. US uniforms tended to follow French practice until 1871, with some British influence. The 1821 uniforms were tighter, more ornate and less field-worthy than those they replaced. There was a fatigue uniform, but it was not used for the field, the regiments would have tried to go into combat in their service dress. There was also a white, light weight linen and cotton uniform for use in the summer in the South. The artillery uniform was similar to the infantry uniform except for the substitution of yellow for white tape and lace for enlisted Soldiers and gold for silver for officers. Officers and non-commissioned officers were also identified by their sashes, silk for officers, wool for NCOs.
(Notice in the right hand illustrations, the artillery unit marching with muskets)
Mounted rangers would have worn frontier clothing, possibly with a sash for officers and NCOs.
The volunteers would wear the uniform prescribed by the state from which they were raised. These uniforms could be less or more ornate than the Regulars, but there was no requirement to follow the Federal regulations. In general, infantry, cavalry and artillery would wear blue coats and rifles would wear green. The volunteer regiments would outfit themselves at muster, but uniforms wore out quickly. Volunteer units in the Mexican War soon found themselves wearing the Regular Army uniform.
The Regular regiments did not carry the National Flag until the 1830s. The standards for the Regular regiments would have been a blue flag with a spread eagle, stars and scroll. The regimental standard would have been a yellow field with a scroll holding the regiment's designation. Volunteer regiments would have had some combination of these standards, the National and State flags, regimental standards and even company flags.
US infantry at Fort Snelling
US artillery at parade